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Last updated 12 October 2026

Trust

Every control on this page is one the software has today. Where something is planned rather than built, it is listed at the bottom under Not in place yet, not mixed in with what is.

The short version

Your records are never used to train AI models. We do not train any models. The AI features run on Anthropic's Claude API, and the excerpts we send it are covered by Anthropic's Commercial Terms of Service, which state in Section B:

“Anthropic may not train models on Customer Content from Services.”

Terms effective 17 June 2025; checked 11 October 2026.

What goes to the AI, and what does not

When you draft a section, analyse a predicate, or ask a question, we send the relevant device details and excerpts of your own records and documents to Anthropic.

  • Not sent: your name, your email address, or any account or workspace identifier.
  • Not stripped: names you have typed into a document yourself. If an excerpt contains a person's name, that name goes with it. We would rather say so than imply otherwise.
  • Logged: every AI call is recorded in your workspace, so you can see what was sent and what came back.

For the full list of who processes your data, see the privacy policy.

Your workspace is walled off in the database

Every record carries a workspace identifier and every query is scoped to the workspace you are working in. Underneath that, PostgreSQL row-level security enforces the same boundary as a second, independent check. The database role the application connects as does not own the tables, so it cannot switch that check off. For a consultant, this is the guarantee that one client's records are not visible from another client's workspace.

Records that cannot be quietly changed

  • Versions are immutable. Editing a record adds a new version; earlier versions stay exactly as they were.
  • The audit trail is append-only, enforced by the database. A database trigger refuses any update or deletion, so the trail cannot be edited by the application, by us, or by you.
  • The trail is hash-chained. Each entry carries a SHA-256 hash of the one before it, so a change anywhere breaks every link after it. Every verification record you export walks the whole chain and reports how many entries it checked, and whether every link held.
  • Legal holds and retention. An owner can place a legal hold on the workspace, a device, a type of record or named records: nothing it covers can be deleted, obsoleted or unlinked until an owner releases it with their password and a reason. Retention rules never delete anything: they start a clock and list what has passed it, for a person to decide.

Signatures

  • Your password, on every signature. Signing anything (a document, a design-history element, a design review or a training record) asks you to re-enter your password. Your session identifies you; the password is the second identification component that 21 CFR Part 11 asks for.
  • Bound to what you signed. Every signature records who signed, what the signature means, and when. A document signature also carries a hash tying it to the exact revision signed.
  • Not replayable. The same person cannot record the same signature on the same record twice. And a document signature aimed at a revision that has since changed is refused, rather than attached to something nobody reviewed.
  • Guessing is limited, and recorded. Repeated wrong passwords at signing are locked out, and every wrong password at signing is written to your audit trail.

We describe these as Part 11-ready records, not as a compliant system. Part 11 compliance also depends on validating the software for its intended use, and that validation package does not exist yet (see below). The clause-by-clause mapping shows where each requirement stands.

AI you can check

  • Provenance on every record. Anything the AI drafted is marked as AI-drafted, and stays marked until a person verifies it. The verification is recorded in the audit trail.
  • A verify gate. AI-drafted content does not count as evidence until a reviewer, editor or owner verifies it. Viewers cannot.
  • A verification record you can hand over. One PDF per device listing what the AI drafted, what it was given to work from, and who verified each item and when, with anything unverified listed first. Each device's audit trail exports alongside it as a spreadsheet, including the hashes that chain it.
  • Citations, or no answer. Ask searches your own records first. If it finds nothing relevant, it says so and the AI is never called, rather than answering from nothing.

21 CFR Part 11, clause by clause

How the software answers each requirement of Part 11, what it does not cover yet, and what stays with you whatever software you use. The requirements are summarised in our words; read the regulation itself before relying on any line. This is our reading, not a compliance opinion: confirm it with your quality team or a qualified professional.

ClauseWhat it asksIn the softwareNot covered, or yours
11.10(a)Validated system; able to discern invalid or altered recordsThe audit trail is hash-chained, so an altered entry breaks the chain, and every verification record reports whether it held.Not covered: no validation package (IQ/OQ/PQ) for this tool exists yet. Validating it for your intended use is your responsibility, and today we cannot hand you the evidence for it.
11.10(b)Accurate, complete copies, human-readable and electronicPDFs per device (design history file, traceability matrix, verification record, classification rationale, substantial-equivalence comparison), a verification certificate per controlled document, and spreadsheets (QMS register, matrix, audit trail with its hashes). A workspace owner can export the whole workspace as one ZIP, with every uploaded file checked against its checksum, a readable index, and a workspace-wide audit trail.Yours: keeping your copies.
11.10(c)Records protected and retrievable for the retention periodVersions are never overwritten, and the database refuses any edit or deletion of the audit trail.Retention rules per record type, and legal holds that block deletion, obsoleting and unlinking until an owner releases them. Yours: your retention schedule, and disposal decisions.
11.10(d)Access limited to authorised individualsSign-in on every request; workspaces isolated twice, in queries and by database row-level security; owners invite and remove members. Outside reviewers get expiring, revocable, read-only links to one device, and every view is logged.Not yet: two-factor sign-in. Yours: deciding who is given access.
11.10(e)Secure, computer-generated, time-stamped audit trail that doesn't obscure earlier entriesThe server writes each audit entry with its own timestamp. The trail is append-only, enforced by the database, and hash-chained, and earlier versions of a record stay readable.—
11.10(f)Operational checks on the permitted sequence of stepsAI drafts count as evidence only once verified; a signature aimed at a revision that changed since review is refused; the same signature can't be recorded twice.Yours: any further sequence your procedures require.
11.10(g)Authority checks: only authorised people sign, alter or operate4 roles across 20 permissions, checked on the server for every request, including signing and verifying.Yours: assigning roles that match people's responsibilities.
11.10(h)Device checks on the source of input, as appropriateRequests must come from a signed-in session, and changes carry an anti-forgery check.An owner can restrict a workspace to approved networks with an IP allow-list. Yours: whether you need it, and keeping the list current.
11.10(i)People who build, maintain or use the system are trainedTraining records can be kept, and signed, in the app.Yours: training your users. We do not yet supply documented evidence of our own team's training.
11.10(j)Written policies holding people accountable for their e-signatures—Yours.
11.10(k)Control over systems documentationEvery change to this software goes through a pull request and automated tests, and both are recorded. A second person’s approval isn’t required yet.Not yet: a documentation package for customers. Yours: control of your own procedures (the documents module versions and signs them).
11.30Extra controls for open systemsWe treat a workspace as a closed system: its owner controls who has access. All traffic is encrypted in transit (HTTPS with HSTS).Yours: whether your quality team classes a hosted service as open or closed. Signatures here are not cryptographic digital signatures.
11.50Signatures show the printed name, date and time, and meaningEach signature records the signer, when, and what it means (authored, reviewed or approved), and exports print them.—
11.70Signatures linked to their records so they can't be copied to anotherEvery signature belongs to one record. A document signature also carries a hash of the exact revision signed.Partly: signatures on other records (design-history elements, design reviews, training) are tied to the record but not hash-bound to a revision.
11.100(a)Each e-signature unique to one person, never reassignedOne account per email address, and an account's email address can't be changed, so a signature can't pass to someone else.Yours: forbidding shared logins.
11.100(b)Identity verified before a signature is assigned—Yours: we do not verify a person's identity.
11.100(c)Certification to FDA that e-signatures are legally binding—Yours: a one-time letter to FDA, before or when you first use electronic signatures.
11.200(a)Two distinct identification components; used only by their ownerYour password is re-entered for every signature. The user ID comes from your signed-in session rather than being typed again.Yours: whether a signed-in session counts as the ID component is a judgement for your quality team, as is the policy that nobody shares a password.
11.200(b)Biometric signaturesNot used.—
11.300(a)Each ID and password combination uniqueOne account per email address.—
11.300(b)Passwords periodically checked or revisedNot enforced: passwords don't expire.Yours: a policy requiring changes, if you want one.
11.300(c)Lost or compromised credentials deauthorisedChanging a password signs out every other session; an owner can remove a member at once; API tokens can be revoked.Yours: the procedure for reporting a lost or compromised password.
11.300(d)Attempts at unauthorised use prevented, detected and reportedWrong passwords are rate-limited at sign-in and locked out at signing. A wrong password at signing is written to your workspace's hash-chained audit trail: who, when, and what they tried to sign, never the password.Not yet: failed sign-ins (as opposed to signing attempts) are recorded only in our application log.
11.300(e)Tokens and cards testedNo tokens or cards are used.—

How the AI works

What the AI is asked to do, what it is never asked to do, and where it can still be wrong.

  • Each workspace's AI sees only that workspace. A consultant working for several clients uses one account, but every AI call is made from one client's workspace, with that workspace's records only, and the results are kept with it. Automated tests check this on every release.
  • An owner can turn AI off. With AI off, no model sees that workspace's records. Predicate search still reads FDA's own public clearance documents, which hold none of your data.
  • One provider, recorded on every call. The AI features run on Anthropic's Claude. If the model declines a request, Anthropic may answer it with one of its fallback models in the same call. Either way, your workspace records the model that actually answered, the task it was given, and when.
  • Answers in a fixed shape. Every request asks for a structured answer against a fixed schema, and the answer is checked against it before anything is saved. A malformed answer is an error, not a record.
  • Ask uses your records first. Ask searches your workspace by keyword, and the model sees only the passages that search found. If nothing matches, you are told so and the model is never called.
  • Reading FDA documents, not judging them. When the AI reads a 510(k) clearance document, its only job is to pull out what the document says. It is required to name any field the document doesn't contain, rather than fill it in. An answer that comes back incomplete is retried once and otherwise marked as incomplete, never treated as whole.
  • The AI reads for meaning; the server does the scoring. A candidate predicate's points are computed by the server from named signals: how closely the indications are worded, the technology, how many other applicants have relied on it, and its recall history. Every point is attributed to a signal you can see. The AI does four narrower things. It reads your intended use into fields (who it's for, where on the body, prescription or over-the-counter), which you can see and correct on the device profile before they're compared. It gives a yes or no, against a stated threshold, on whether two intended-use statements describe the same use, and a candidate it can't decide on goes to a person under “could not tell”. It says whether each candidate's technology is the same, related or different, which sets the order of the shortlist. It also writes the explanation of signals the server has already computed.
  • Drafts stay drafts. Everything the AI writes enters your records as AI-drafted and unverified, and counts for nothing until a person verifies it (above).

Where it can be wrong. The AI can misread a document, miss a relevant record, or phrase something with more confidence than the evidence supports. We test predicate search against past FDA clearances, which is a best case, because the right answer is known to be in FDA's data. We do not publish an accuracy figure yet. Nothing here is regulatory advice: confirm pathway and predicate decisions with FDA or a qualified professional.

Access and transport

  • 4 roles (viewer, reviewer, editor, owner) across 20 permissions, checked on every request.
  • Access you can end. An owner sees everyone who can reach a workspace on its Members and access screen, can give anyone an end date, and can revoke them. A revoke takes effect on that person's next request: their read-only links stop working, and their open comments, review requests and package sections move to an owner. Ended access stays listed, with who ended it and when, and the audit trail keeps everything they did.
  • Outside consultants author and review; your people approve. An owner can let someone in as a consultant. A consultant can't sign a document as its approver unless the owner allows it for that person.
  • Read-only share links. An owner can give a client or outside reviewer a link to one device's verification record, classification rationale, traceability matrix and audit trail, with no account. Links expire after 7, 14 or 30 days, can be revoked at any time, store only a hash of the link, and every view and download is written to the workspace's audit trail.
  • Single sign-on. A workspace can sign its team in through its own identity provider over OpenID Connect (Okta, Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace and others). The provider can only sign in addresses on email domains the workspace has proven it controls with a DNS record, and every sign-in is checked against the provider's published keys. An owner can require it for everyone else; owners keep their password so a broken provider never locks a workspace out. The provider's client secret is stored encrypted and never shown again.
  • IP allow-list. An owner can limit a workspace to approved networks (an office, a VPN). Anyone elsewhere is refused, owners included, in the app, with API tokens and through the AI connector. Saving a list that would lock out the owner saving it is refused, and every change is written to the audit trail.
  • Passwords are hashed with argon2id and never stored. Sign-in attempts are rate-limited.
  • Usage data is pseudonymous and stays with us. We record which features are used, by a random ID rather than by name, with no IP addresses, content or record IDs, in our own database, for 13 months. No third-party analytics. Details on the privacy page.
  • HTTPS everywhere, with HTTP Strict Transport Security, an enforced Content Security Policy, and standard security headers.
  • Encryption at rest is provided by our hosting platform. Infrastructure is in the United States.

Not in place yet

Listed so that nothing above is read as covering them.

  • Two-factor sign-in (MFA)
  • Single sign-on over SAML (OpenID Connect is in place)
  • SOC 2 Type II and ISO 27001
  • A data processing agreement (DPA) ready to sign: a draft is awaiting legal review
  • A HIPAA programme and business associate agreement
  • A software-validation package (IQ/OQ/PQ) for this tool itself

Questions

If any of this matters to a decision you are making, email us. We would rather answer a hard question now than have you find the answer later.

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